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Abstract
The rural poor in developing countries, once economically isolated, are increasingly
being connected to regional markets. Whether these new connections crowd out or
encourage educational investment is a central question. We examine the impacts on
educational choices of 115,000 new roads built under India’s flagship road construction
program. We find that children stay in school longer and perform better on standard-
ized exams. Treatment heterogeneity supports the predictions of a standard human
capital investment model: enrollment increases are largest where nearby labor markets
o↵er the highest returns to education and lowest where they imply high opportunity
costs of schooling.
JEL Codes: I25; O18; J24.
⇤For helpful comments and guidance, we thank Martha Bailey, Chris Blattman, Liz Cascio, Eric
Edmonds, Rick Hornbeck, Ruixue Jia, Ofer Malamud, Doug Staiger, Bryce Steinberg, and participants of
seminars at Dartmouth, NEUDC, APPAM, CSWEP, Georgetown University and University of Chicago. We
thank Srinivas Balasubramanian, Anwita Mahajan, Olga Namen, and Taewan Roh for excellent research
assistance. We thank Arun Mehta and Aparna Mookerjee for help in data acquisition.
†University of Chicago, 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, adukia@uchicago.edu
‡World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433, sasher@worldbank.org
§Dartmouth College, Economics Department, 6106 Rockefeller Center, Room 301, Hanover, NH 03755,
paul.novosad@dartmouth.edu
I Introduction
Increased access to international markets has important influences on schooling decisions,
which are central to supporting long-run economic growth.1 A large share of the world’s
rural poor are not well-connected to international markets, however, and depend instead on
domestic linkages to nearby towns and cities.2 But the impacts of domestic market inte-
gration are less studied than the impacts of connection to international markets. The key
individual tradeo↵ is between long-run investment in human capital and immediate economic
opportunities that might discourage increased schooling. Connections to new markets should
encourage educational attainment if they increase returns to education, or otherwise raise
household income or liquidity. However, immediate earnings opportunities for the young
could motivate an earlier exit from schooling.
We examine the human capital investment response when a paved road is built to a previ-
ously unconnected village, e↵ectively connecting it to a wider market. The source of variation
is the rollout of India’s national rural road construction program (PMGSY, or Prime Minis-
ter’s Road Construction Program), under which the government built high quality roads to
over 115,000 villages across the country between 2001 and 2011, connecting over 30 million
rural households to nearby towns. We focus on new rural feeder roads, which provide ter-
minal connections between the broader transportation network and previously unconnected
villages. Ex ante, the impact of new road connections on schooling is theoretically ambigu-
ous, because they are likely to both raise the returns to education and raise the opportunity
cost of schooling.
The major challenge in estimating causal e↵ects of new roads is the endogeneity of road
placement. If, for example, roads are targeted either to wealthy or poor regions, then com-
parisons of villages with and without roads will be biased. To overcome this bias, we exploit
the timing of road completion in each village, estimating a panel regression with village and
1See, for example, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006), Edmonds et al. (2010) and Shastry (2012).
2See, for example, Atkin and Donaldson (2015), who show that domestic trade costs in developing
countries can be considerably higher than international.
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state-time fixed e↵ects. Village fixed e↵ects control for unobserved village-specific factors
that may have influenced the timing of road construction. State-time fixed e↵ects control
for time-variant state-specific shocks and policies. Essentially, we compare educational out-
comes in villages before and after a road is built, flexibly controlling for time-variant regional
shocks and static di↵erences between early-treated and late-treated villages.
We use village-level enrollment data from India’s national annual school enrollment census
for the first through the eighth grades, the District Information System for Education (DISE,
2002-2011). Through a combination of human and machine-based fuzzy matching, we linked
DISE data to administrative data from the national rural road construction program. The
result is a panel of over 300,000 villages across all of India. The use of census data is essential
to our analysis, since variation in the road program is at the village-level. It also gives us
power to precisely estimate impacts in subsamples of the population. Our estimates span the
range of conditions in India today and across many places worldwide that remain unreached
by paved roads.
We find that road construction significantly increases enrollment among middle-school
children, who are most at risk of leaving school. We estimate that connecting a village with
a new paved road causes a seven percent increase in middle-school enrollment over the fol-
lowing two years.3 The estimates are precise and statistically significant. We also estimate
increases in the number of students taking and scoring highly on middle-school completion
exams, indicating that educational performance is improving in addition to school enroll-
ment.4 The results are robust to a range of specifications and sample definitions, as well as a
regression discontinuity specification that exploits a program rule that caused villages above
specific village population thresholds to be targeted for road construction.
Next, we explore variation in treatment e↵ects, guided by a standard human capital in-
3We are not able to estimate the impact on enrollment rates, because our data contains gross enrollment
statistics and we do not have village-level population disaggregated by age. We estimate precise zero e↵ects
on migration, however, which implies that these estimates are driven by increased enrollment rates.
4In many cases, interventions that improve attendance and enrollment do not improve student test
scores (e.g., Miguel and Kremer (2004), Behrman et al. (2008), Adukia (2016)), perhaps due to congestion.
Congestion e↵ects in our study may be counterbalanced by already-enrolled children working harder.
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vestment model. The model predicts four primary mechanisms. Under an assumption that
roads lead to factor price equalization, a new road can: (i) raise the unskilled wage and
thereby increase the opportunity cost of schooling; (ii) raise the skill premium and thus
increase the returns to education; (iii) increase lifetime household earnings (an income ef-
fect); and (iv) ease a liquidity constraint. To test the importance of these mechanisms, we
generate regional measures of predicted changes in wages and returns to education. The
variation in treatment e↵ects across these measures supports the standard human capital
investment model. Schooling impacts are larger where a road would be most expected to
raise the returns to education and smaller in places where it would be expected to most raise
the opportunity cost of schooling. Partitioning our data according to these measures, we
find that market integration leads to statistically detectable improvements in 59% of villages
and ambiguous e↵ects in the remaining 41%. The ranking of e↵ect sizes for each subgroup
is consistent with predictions from the standard model. Importantly, even where the model
predicts the smallest e↵ect, we find a positive but small point estimate.
We explore and rule out several other channels: (i) migration e↵ects; (ii) supply-side im-
provements in school infrastructure; (iii) displacement e↵ects among nearby villages; and (iv)
improved access for children on the outskirts of villages. Consistent with earlier literature,
we find no enrollment e↵ects on primary-school children, for whom there is less scope for
increased school enrollment and fewer opportunities for productive work.5,6
Our findings suggest that integrating the rural poor with regional markets has the poten-
tial to drive further long-run growth through increased educational attainment. Despite the
low quality of schools in rural India (see ASER Centre (2014) for a summary), enrollment
and exam performance respond positively to increased economic opportunities. Our results
also provide context for the strong correlation around the world between education, growth,
and trade.
5However, we do find small increases in primary-school performance, suggesting that students may be
increasing school e↵ort on the intensive margin.
6We have enrollment data only through middle school, so cannot test for e↵ects on secondary-school
enrollment.
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This study is related to a growing literature on the impact of labor demand shocks on
schooling decisions, which finds both positive and negative schooling impacts from new eco-
nomic opportunities.7 This ambiguity makes sense in the context of the human capital
model, because new opportunities can change both the opportunity costs and long-run ben-
efits of schooling. Our exploration of heterogeneous e↵ects within India helps to reconcile
these di↵erent results. Our work is also related to studies of the impact of India’s national
public works program (the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, or NREGS) on
human capital accumulation.8 These studies are concerned with exogenous shocks to local
labor markets; but none of them are directly informative about the e↵ect of improving vil-
lage access to already-existing nearby markets. Impacts of road connections are particularly
policy-relevant, as the degree of market integration between villages and their nearby towns
is a direct consequence of infrastructure investment policy.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the development impacts of transport in-
frastructure.9 Relative to earlier work on roads and schooling, our large village-level sample
and research design allow a more precise estimation of the causal e↵ects of road construction.
7The opening of new outsourcing facilities in India and garment factories in Bangladesh have driven
increases in schooling (Jensen, 2012; Oster and Steinberg, 2013; Heath and Mobarak, 2015). Positive
agricultural demand shocks in India, expansion of natural gas fracking in the United States, and expanded
export manufacturing in Mexico have increased dropout rates, especially for middle-school children and
older children (Shah and Steinberg, 2016; Cascio and Narayan, 2015; Atkin, 2016).
8Studies on Andhra Pradesh find that access to the workfare program increases children’s enrollment
(Afridi et al., 2013) and test scores (Mani et al., 2014). All-India studies find increased enrollment for
primary-school-aged children, but decreased enrollment for middle and high school children (Islam and
Sivasankaran, 2014; Das and Singh, 2013; Li and Sekhri, 2015; Shah and Steinberg, 2015). NREGS increases
demand for unskilled labor, and thus raises the opportunity cost of schooling; it is unlikely to increase
returns to education, though it could have important income or liquidity e↵ects.
9Some examples include Jacoby (2000); Jacoby and Minten (2009); Donaldson (2016); Gibson and
Olivia (2010); Mu and van de Walle (2011); Hornbeck and Donaldson (2013); Casaburi et al. (2013). For a
detailed review, including studies on the impacts or highways and regional roads, see Hine et al. (2016). In a
working paper, Mukherjee (2011) uses a regression discontinuity approach around population thresholds and
finds that PMGSY increases school enrollment. We present comparable regression discontinuity estimates
on middle-school enrollment in the robustness section, but we favor the panel estimates: they are an order
of magnitude more precise and allow for analysis of treatment heterogeneity. Asher and Novosad (2016)
show that PMGSY road construction leads to a reallocation of village labor from agricultural work to wage
work, also using regression discontinuity. The more precise panel approach is not used in Asher and Novosad
(2016) because village-level economic outcomes are not available on an annual basis, whereas we use annual
school enrollment data. Using district-level data from India, Aggarwal (2015) finds an association between
road construction and school enrollment. Khandker et al. (2009) and Khandker and Koolwal (2011) show
that small-scale road construction in Bangladesh is associated with increased school enrollment.
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The precision of the estimates also permits a more detailed exploration of heterogeneity of
road impacts with respect to local labor market conditions in treated villages and nearby
markets. Finally, we contribute to a wide body of research on improving educational attain-
ment in developing countries (see Glewwe and Muralidharan (2016) and Evans and Popova
(2016) for reviews of this literature). Our results highlight that investments outside the
education sector can have first order e↵ects on schooling decisions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a conceptual framework describing
human capital investment decisions and the role of market integration. Section III provides
background on road construction and education in India. We describe the data in Section IV
and the empirical strategy in Section V. Section VI presents basic results, Section VII ex-
plores the mechanisms suggested by the human capital model, and Section VIII concludes.
II Conceptual Framework: Schooling Decisions and Economic Opportunity
We outline a standard conceptual framework to help explain how human capital investment
decisions respond to changes in labor market opportunities (Becker, 1954). This framework
helps to reconcile why the impacts of labor demand shocks on schooling vary across the em-
pirical literature, and motivates our later analysis of how roads’ impacts on rural schooling
decisions are a↵ected by local labor market conditions outside the village.
The key decision point in the framework is the individual’s tradeo↵ between the long-run
benefits of human capital accumulation and the short-run return to labor. A two-period
model is su cient to highlight the essential comparative statics. In the first period, an agent
chooses between working for a low-skill wage and obtaining schooling. In the second period,
the agent works and receives either a high or a low wage, depending upon his or her school-
ing choice in the first period. The agent consumes in both periods, drawing from an initial
endowment and wages earned in each period that the agent works. The agent can save, but
may be restricted in borrowing. The agent’s initial endowment can reflect household wealth
or wages of household adults who have completed their schooling. Education may also be a
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normal good, which households value independently of its impact on future wages.10
When a village is connected to an external market via a new road, the parameters under-
lying this tradeo↵ change. The first order e↵ect of reduced transport costs is likely to be a
change in prices due to factor price equalization. In equilibrium, urban areas have higher
wages than rural areas for both unskilled and skilled workers, and higher Mincerian returns
to education.11 Connecting a village to its external market is therefore likely to: (i) increase
the unskilled wage; and (ii) increase the return to education. We can think of all of these as
changes in real wages, such that any changes in local goods prices due to road construction
are subsumed in the above e↵ects.12
An increase in the low-skill wage raises the opportunity cost of schooling and motivates
agents to reduce human capital investments—we call this the opportunity cost e↵ect. An
increase in the high-skill wage raises the return to education, and motivates increased human
capital accumulation—the returns to education e↵ect. The opportunity cost e↵ect is likely to
reduce schooling, while the returns-to-education e↵ect is likely to increase schooling. Which
of these factors dominates is ultimately an empirical question.
Regional labor market conditions are plausibly good predictors of the sizes of the opportu-
nity cost and returns to education e↵ects, because regional markets are likely to dictate the
magnitude of changes in skilled and unskilled wages when a village becomes integrated with
that market. Under an assumption that roads lead to factor price equalization, the opportu-
nity cost e↵ect should be particularly large when the unskilled regional wage is much larger
than the unskilled wage in the unconnected village. Similarly, the returns to education e↵ect
should be larger when regional returns to education are much larger than village returns to
10This framework underlies much of the theoretical literature on child labor and human capital invest-
ment decisions. See, for example, Ranjan (1999) or Baland and Robinson (2000). We abstract away from
intra-household bargaining, because it does not change our key predictions.
11These facts are documented in Appendix Table A1.
12It is possible that these static price di↵erentials reflect unobserved di↵erences in skills of workers in
di↵erent locations, even controlling for education. For example, the quality of education in rural areas is
probably lower than in urban areas. However, it is doubtful that unobserved education quality di↵erences
drive the entire di↵erential, given the presence of higher skilled jobs in cities and towns, and the high
returns to rural-to-urban migration documented in other studies, e.g. Bryan et al. (2014).
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education. We exploit these regional labor market characteristics when we study treatment
heterogeneity in Section VII.13
III Background and Details of the Road Construction Program
The study period (2002-2011) was a period of substantial education reform in India. Sev-
eral programs were put into place with the explicit goal of increasing school participation,
including a national drive supporting the goal of universal primary education under the
flagship program Sarve Shiksha Abhiyan (Education for All). School enrollment increased
substantially over this period, parallel to a similar global trend.
Both educational attainment and economic growth vary substantially across India. Rural
areas are poorer and less educated than urban areas, and development outcomes mono-
tonically deteriorate with distance from urban centers (Asher et al., 2016). Indian policy-
makers have long allocated public goods with an aim to mitigate spatial inequality, but
large disparities remain and are at the center of public debate in India (Banerjee and So-
manathan, 2007; Dreze and Sen, 2013). The high cost and poor durability of roads have
constrained the ability of the government to connect every village: in 2001, 49 percent of
Indian villages remained inaccessible by all-season roads. These villages were characterized
by greater poverty and lower educational attainment.
In 2000, the Government of India launched the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana
(Prime Minister’s Road Construction Program, or PMGSY), a national program with the
goal of eventually building a paved road to every village in India. The federal government
issued implementation guidelines, but decisions on village-level allocations of roads were
ultimately made at the district level. While one of the guidelines is a population-based eligi-
bility criteria, in practice it was followed in only a subset of states, and even in these states
13We do not focus on heterogeneity in size of income and liquidity e↵ects, as these are more di cult
to proxy with regional data. Liquidity e↵ects in particular are di cult to identify without individual data
and information on shocks that a↵ect liquidity and not income (Edmonds, 2006). Further, Asher and
Novosad (2016) find that, in the short run, income and assets respond much less to PMGSY roads than
occupation change. New roads could also plausibly a↵ect education choices due to changed preferences, a
changing marriage market, changes in healthcare access, or improved access to information. Without access
to individual village-level data, we are unable to address these possibilities.
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it overlapped with several other eligibility criteria. We exploit the population threshold rule
in a robustness section, and we discuss it in more detail in Section VI.C. Roads were tar-
geted to habitations, which are the smallest rural administrative unit in India; a village is
typically comprised of between one and three habitations.14 We focus on villages as the unit
of analysis, because (i) many villages have only one habitation; (ii) many habitations were
pooled to the village level for the purposes of the program; and (iii) very little economic data
is available at the habitation level.
At the outset, about 170,000 habitations in approximately 80,000 villages were eligible
for the program, a number that has grown as the guidelines have been expanded to include
smaller villages. By 2011, over 115,000 villages had access roads built or upgraded under the
program. Construction projects were most often managed through subcontracts with larger
firms, and were built with capital-intensive methods and external labor; the building of the
road itself is therefore not a major local labor demand shock. These roads are distinct from
new roads being built under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS),
which are less durable roads that are built with labor intensive methods.15 Figure 1 shows
that road construction is increasing over time and that roll out has varied significantly by
state between 2001 and 2011. The median road length was 4.4 kilometers.
IV Data
We constructed a village panel dataset, combining data on road construction with village
characteristics and educational outcomes. We matched three successive Indian Population
Censuses (1991, 2001, 2011) to an annual census of Indian schools, the District Informa-
tion System for Education (DISE, 2002-2011), as well as the administrative data from the
implementation of the road program (2001-2011). All data were merged primarily through
14There are approximately 600,000 villages in India and 1.5 million habitations.
15We are aware of no other major rural road construction program in India during this period. Local
or district administrators interested in road construction were more likely to lobby for PMGSY roads than
allocate other funding to new roads. To the extent that sample villages received roads from other sources
during the sample period, it would bias our estimates toward zero. Major highway projects during this
period, such as the Golden Quadrilateral, were planned and executed independently of PMGSY; there is no
evidence of coordination of PMGSY roads with the construction of the Golden Quadrilateral.
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fuzzy matching of location names, though in some cases unique identifiers were available for
subsets of the match.16,17
The DISE is an annual census of primary and middle schools in India. It includes data on
student enrollment, exam completion, and school infrastructure. This dataset was created
by the Ministry of Human Resource Development of the Government of India and is ad-
ministered by the National University of Educational Planning and Administration. DISE
data are considered to comprehensively cover every registered Indian government primary
and middle school beginning in 2005.18 We also have DISE data for a smaller sample of
schools from 2002-2004, a period when the data-collection system was still being rolled out
on a district-by-district basis. We are able to replicate national survey-based statistics on
enrollment, suggesting that the DISE data are reliable.19
Our primary outcome variable is log middle-school enrollment, which we define as the
natural logarithm of the total number of middle-school children enrolled in all schools in a
village. As with the previous literature, we focus on outcomes for middle-school children
(grades 6-8), both because there is little variation in dropout rates for younger children and
because younger children have fewer labor market opportunities. Further, the transition to
middle school is a natural breakpoint in a child’s schooling at which educational milestones
are often measured. DISE does not report enrollment information for higher grades, nor
16For fuzzy matching, we used a combination of the reclink program in Stata, and a custom fuzzy
matching script based on the Levenshtein algorithm but modified for the languages used in India. The
fuzzy matching algorithm can be downloaded from the corresponding author’s web site.
17We were able to match 83 percent of villages in the road administrative data to the population censuses,
and 65 percent of villages in DISE. The match rate is worse for DISE because of frequent miscoding of
census block identifiers in the DISE dataset. We matched 80 percent of census blocks; within census blocks,
we matched 81 percent of villages.
18We refer to academic years (which begin in June or July) according to the beginning of the school year
(i.e., we refer to academic year 2007-08 as 2007).
19We dropped enrollment observations from DISE that appeared to be erroneous. Our preferred sample
drops all villages that reported total enrollment (first through eighth grades) greater than 60 percent of
total population, which was the 99th percentile of this statistic. By comparison, in 2001 only 22.4 percent
of the population was of primary- or middle-school age (ages 6-15). Demographic data from the Below
Poverty Line Census (2002) suggests that fewer than 40 percent of village residents are between 6 and 15
years of age in 99 percent of villages. We also dropped several state-years where the 75% or more of the
data was missing (Jharkhand 2005, Karnataka 2005, and Uttarakhand 2006). Our results are not materially
changed by these decisions.
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does it report the total number of school-age children in a village, so we are unable to cal-
culate enrollment rates. However, we can track total village population at 10-year intervals,
allowing us to indirectly make inferences about enrollment rates.
DISE collects information on examination outcomes in the set of states with terminal
primary- and middle-school examinations. These are used for promotion decisions and com-
pletion verification. The information collected includes the number of students that appeared
for the exam, that passed the exam, and that scored with distinction. Examination data
are available for years 2004-2009. Finally, we use DISE data on school infrastructure, which
describes the school-level presence of blackboards, electricity, sanitation facilities, water (by
source), a playground, a library, a boundary wall, access to regular medical checkups, and
access ramps.
For data on road construction, we use the administrative records which are used to track
and implement the PMGSY program, which we scraped from the government’s public re-
porting portal for this program.20 Road data are reported at either the village or habitation
level; we aggregate these data to the village level. We define a village as having a paved
road at baseline if any habitation in that village had a paved road. We define a village as
receiving a new road by a given year if any habitation in the village received a new road
before September 30 of the school year, which is the date on which DISE records enrollment
numbers. We restrict our sample to villages that did not have a paved road in 2001, and we
discard villages where roads were categorized as upgrades rather than as new roads. We fur-
ther limit the primary analysis sample to villages that received new program roads between
2003 and 2010, so that we have at least one pre- and post-treatment year for each village.
Appendix Figure A1 shows how we arrive at our final sample of villages. Our main estimates
are drawn from the 11,905 villages which built roads between 2003 and 2010. We find similar
results when we broaden to an unbalanced sample (n=17,920), or include villages that never
received PMGSY roads (n=112,475).
20At the time of writing, the Indian government’s public reporting portal for PMGSY was hosted at
http://omms.nic.in.
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To calculate district-level rural and urban wages, which we use to measure the opportunity
cost and returns to education e↵ects, we use the 55th round of the NSS Employment and Un-
employment Survey, undertaken in 1999-2000. Finally, we use data from the 1991, 2001 and
2011 Population Censuses of India, which include village population and other demographic
data. We also use the 1998 rural Economic Census to generate village level control variables.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of villages at baseline. The enrollment dropo↵ at mid-
dle school is substantial: the average village has primary-school cohorts with 36 children per
year on average, and middle-school cohorts with only 14 children per year.
V Empirical strategy
Our goal is to estimate the causal impact of roads on educational choices. Cross-sectional es-
timates of the relationship between a village’s accessibility and schooling decisions are biased
by the fact that villages that do not have access to paved roads are di↵erent from connected
villages along many dimensions. They are likely to be smaller, have more di cult terrain,
and be more politically marginalized. Our primary empirical specification is a panel fixed
e↵ect regression that exploits the timing of road construction, within the set of all villages
that received new roads under the program by 2011.
The panel estimation exploits variation in the year that a village was connected to the
road network. The panel estimator is defined by the following equation:
(1) Yi,s,t =   ·ROADi,s,t +  s,t + ⌘i + ✏i,s,t.
Yi,s,t is the outcome variable (such as school enrollment), measured in village i and state
s in year t. ROADi,s,t is an indicator of whether the village has been connected by a paved
road by year t.  s,t is a state-year fixed e↵ect, and ⌘i is a village fixed e↵ect. The error term,
✏i,s,t, is clustered at the village level to account for serial correlation in the dependent vari-
able.   is the coe cient of interest and measures the impact of a new road on village-level
enrollment. All villages have ROADi,2002 = 0 and ROADi,2011 = 1, i.e., all sample villages
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received a road at some point under the program between 2002 and 2011. We thus avoid
making a potentially biased comparison between villages that were and were not eligible for
new roads. Unless otherwise specified, the outcome variable is the natural logarithm of one
plus enrollment, so impacts can be interpreted as percentage changes.
The state-year fixed e↵ects control flexibly for di↵erential enrollment growth across states.
This alleviates any concern that states with more e↵ective governments simultaneously built
roads and also provided other government services; it also controls for any broader regional
trends in enrollment that might be correlated with road construction. The village fixed
e↵ects control for systematic di↵erences between early- and late-treated villages. No addi-
tional controls are included, because the village fixed e↵ects account for all static village
characteristics, and we do not have data on any time varying characteristics of villages other
than school enrollment. We also present specifications that control for village time trends.
The panel estimates can be interpreted as unbiased causal e↵ects under the assumption that
the only changes that occurred in a village at the time that a road was built were changes
caused by that road.
VI Results
VI.A Average Impacts on School Enrollment
Table 2 shows estimates of the e↵ect of road construction on village school enrollment, using
Equation 1. Column 1 shows the balanced panel estimate from the 11,905 villages in our
sample that were unconnected at baseline and received a road between 2003 and 2010. The
estimate implies that a new road leads to a seven percent increase in middle-school enroll-
ment. The estimate is statistically significant, with a p-value less than 0.001. Given the
sample mean of 41 students enrolled in middle school, this corresponds to approximately
three additional students in middle school, an average of two years after a road is built.21
Figure 2 shows individual coe cients from a regression of log middle-school enrollment on
21Most villages are observed several times after being treated. The estimate is thus a weighted di↵erence
between enrollment in all treated years and enrollment in untreated years. The average number of treated
years in this sample is two.
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a set of relative time dummies, which indicate the number of years before or after treatment
of a given observation. The estimating equation is:
(2) Yi,s,t =
X
⌧2( 4,+4),⌧ 6= 1
⇣⌧
   
t = ttreatmenti,s + ⌧
  
+  s,t + ⌘i + ✏i,s,t,
where ⌧ indicates the year relative to when a new road was built, i.e., ⌧ =  1 is the year
before road construction. State-year and village fixed e↵ects are included as above, and the
year before the road is built (⌧ =  1) is omitted. We plot the ⌧ coe cients in Figure 2. The
graph confirms that the enrollment increase corresponds to the timing of the construction
of the new road.22 The timing and persistence of the change in enrollment also makes it un-
likely that our treatment e↵ects are driven by labor demand on the actual road construction
project; if e↵ects were driven by work on the road itself, we would expect to see changes
before the road was built and disappearing rapidly thereafter.
In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1, we split the main result into enrollment of boys and
enrollment of girls respectively. Results are slightly higher for girls than for boys (7.0% vs.
5.6%), but the di↵erence is not statistically significant (p=0.28). Columns 4 through 6 show
comparable estimates using the level of middle-school enrollment as the dependent variable
rather than log enrollment. Enrollment increases by approximately three students per village
in response to a new road, which is consistent with the log estimates.
VI.B Robustness: Sample Definition and Specification
The average estimated enrollment e↵ect is robust under a range of empirical specifications
and sample definitions. In Column 1 of Table 3, we add village-specific linear time trends to
the main specification, which leaves the treatment estimate substantively unchanged. In Col-
umn 2, we interact year fixed e↵ects with baseline village characteristics that could plausibly
influence both treatment year and enrollment growth: population, number of schools, log
22Given the standard errors on the estimates in the individual years after road construction, we do
not make inferences about whether the impact is gradual or immediate. There is no sign that enrollment
growth precedes road construction; if anything, the trajectory is slightly downward relative to state trends.
However, the downward trend is not statistically distinguishable from a zero trend.
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middle- and primary-school enrollment, literacy rate, population share of scheduled castes,
and distance to nearest town. In Column 3, we expand to an unbalanced sample which
includes villages with missing data in one or more years; Column 4 shows the unbalanced
sample result with village time trends. In Column 5, we restrict the data to years after 2004,
when the DISE data has the highest coverage of villages and schools. Column 6 restricts the
sample to a set of villages for which we have three observations before and three observa-
tions after the completion of road construction; the sample is limited to those observations,
thus providing seven observations per village. All estimates remain consistent in terms of
magnitude and statistical significance. Given that all these specifications permit di↵erential
functional forms of time-variant village characteristics, the stability of the treatment e↵ect
strongly suggests that these estimates are not driven by di↵erent types of villages being
treated at di↵erent times.23 Appendix Table A2 repeats Table 2 with district-by-year fixed
e↵ects, in which estimates are substantively unchanged.24
We run a randomization test to verify that our p-values are estimated correctly. In the
spirit of the Fisher Randomization Test, we randomly generate a placebo year of road comple-
tion for each village, and then estimate Equation 1 as if the placebo year were the treatment
year. We run this estimation 1000 times; Appendix Figure A2 shows the distribution of  ,
the placebo impacts of a new road on log middle-school enrollment growth. This gives us a
non-parametric distribution of test statistics under the sharp null hypothesis, with existing
data. As expected, the placebo estimates are centered around zero, and none of the thousand
estimates attains our primary estimate of the e↵ect of a new road on log enrollment (0.07
increase in log enrollment). This result is consistent with our finding of a p-value less than
0.001 for our main estimate.
Columns 1-3 of Appendix Table A3 show comparable estimates for primary-school enroll-
ment. Consistent with much of the prior work on labor market impacts on schooling, we
23We use village time trends as a robustness check, rather than in the main specification, because of the
possibility that the time trends in part pick up the e↵ects of the new road over time (Wolfers, 2006). This
said, all results presented below are similarly unchanged by inclusion of village time trends.
24All panel estimates below are robust to inclusion of district-by-year fixed e↵ects.
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find no e↵ects on younger children. This is not that surprising, given that India had almost
achieved universal primary completion in this period and that children under the age of
twelve have few labor market opportunities.
VI.C Robustness: Regression Discontinuity
In this section, we present regression discontinuity estimates of the impact of new roads on
schooling (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Under the program guidelines, states were instructed
to first target villages with populations greater than 1000 in the population census, and
then villages with population greater than 500. Only some states followed these guidelines,
and even then, each followed the rules to di↵erent degrees, in part because there were often
several conflicting guidelines.25 In states where there were few unconnected villages with
populations over 1000, they tended to use the 500-person threshold immediately. In most
states, construction proceeded in villages both above and below the population threshold
simultaneously, but there were more villages treated above the threshold, and these were
treated sooner. Proximate villages could combine populations to cross the thresholds; we
are not able to observe the sets of villages that did so. For all these reasons, population
above a treatment threshold is an imperfect predictor of program treatment status. Figure 3
shows the relationship between the share of unconnected villages that received new roads
before 2011 and the population relative to the treatment threshold. The change in treat-
ment status at the population threshold is highly visible. There is no discontinuous change
in the number of villages on either side of the cuto↵, indicating that village population was
not manipulated to target road construction.26 Further, there is no discontinuous di↵erence
25For example, under certain circumstances, proximate habitations could pool their populations to
exceed this cuto↵. We met several times with the National Rural Roads Development Agency, the national
coordinating body for the program, to identify the set of states that adhered to program guidelines and
which eligibility thresholds were used. The states in the sample are Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha and Rajasthan.
26To test this formally, we fit a non-parametric function to the village population distribution, with
allowance for a discontinuity at the treatment threshold (McCrary, 2008); the p-value testing the null of no
discontinuity is 0.31. Appendix Figure A3 presents the population histogram and the graphical rendering
of the McCrary Test.
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among these villages’ baseline characteristics prior to road construction.27
We estimate the impacts of road construction using the following implementation of a
local linear estimator:
ln(Yi,s,2011)  ln(Yi,s,2011) =  11{popi,s,2001   T   0}+  2(popi,s,2001   T )+
 3(popi,s,2001   T ) ⇤ 1{popi,s,2001   T   0}+  4 ln(Yi,s,2002) +  Xi,s,2001 + ⌘s +  i,s.
(3)
Yi,s,t is log enrollment in village i, region s at time t, T is the population threshold, popi,s,2001
is baseline village population (the running variable), Xi,s,2001 is a vector of village controls
measured at baseline, and ⌘s is a region fixed e↵ect.28 The change in the outcome vari-
able across the population threshold T is captured by  1. The population controls allow
for di↵erent slopes on either side of the treatment threshold. We limit the sample to pop-
ulations close to the treatment threshold, using an optimal bandwidth calculation (Imbens
and Kalyanaraman, 2012). Note that unlike the panel estimates, we estimate the regression
discontinuity using only the first and last year of data. Given that the first stage is largest
in the final year, this maximizes the power of the test.29
Panel A of Table 4 presents regression discontinuity estimates of the impact of road treat-
ment on middle-school enrollment. Column 1 reports the first stage estimate, where the
dependent variable is a village-level indicator equal to one if a village received a road. 33%
of villages in the sample received new roads by 2011; a village just above the population
treatment threshold is 22 percentage points more likely to receive a new road. Figure 3
presents a graphical analog to this estimate. Column 2 reports the reduced form estimate of
27Appendix Table A4 shows coe cient estimates for the full set of village covariates measured in the
period before any roads were built. None of the point estimates are significantly di↵erent from zero at
the 10 percent threshold. Appendix Figure A4 presents graphical evidence that these variables do not
vary systematically at the treatment threshold. For additional robustness tests indicating balance of this
regression discontinuity specification, see Asher and Novosad (2016).
28For control variables, we include baseline log enrollment, the illiteracy rate, number of primary schools,
number of middle schools (all from the 2001 Population Census), and the log number of non-farm jobs in
the village (from the 1998 Economic Census).
29Since the same treatment thresholds were used in each program year, villages have very similar
predicted treatment status in each year. There is thus little to gain from including data from years with
weaker first stages.
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the impact of crossing the population threshold on village-level annualized log middle-school
enrollment growth from 2002 to 2011. Column 3 presents the estimate from the IV spec-
ification, which indicates that a new road increases middle-school enrollment growth by 6
percentage points per year. Figure 4 shows the graphical analog of these estimates, in which
the discontinuity at zero in the graph reflects the increased enrollment in villages just above
the eligibility cuto↵ for the roads program.
As a placebo test, we run the same empirical specification on the states that did not fol-
low program guidelines.30 Panel B of Table 4 shows that there is no substantive first stage
in these states (Column 1), and encouragingly, an estimated treatment e↵ect close to zero.
This provides reassurance that there is not some other characteristic of villages above the
population threshold that caused their schooling to grow.31
Given that the median year of road construction in the RD sample was 2007 (i.e., halfway
through the period over which we annualize growth), the RD estimate implies an average
impact in treated years of 12 percentage points per year. To compare this to the panel esti-
mates, we would need to first annualize the panel estimates. Since the average panel village
has been treated for approximately two years, the main estimate indicates an annualized
treatment e↵ect of 3.7 percentage points; about a third of the RD estimate. However, the
RD estimate is substantially less precise; the 95% confidence interval of the RD estimate
includes the panel estimate.32
The regression discontinuity estimates corroborate the results from our main panel spec-
ification, indicating substantially higher middle-school enrollment following road construc-
tion, though the panel estimates are more easily extended to explore further the underlying
30Major states that built roads under PMGSY but did not follow program guidelines include Andhra
Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand.
31Columns 4 and 5 of Appendix Table A3 show analogous RD estimates of log primary-school en-
rollment growth. Consistent with the di↵erences-in-di↵erences estimates, the RD indicates no change in
primary-school enrollment.
32The two methods estimate di↵erent local average treatment e↵ects. The RD compares villages that
receive roads to villages that never receive roads, whereas the panel estimator compares villages that receive
roads earlier to villages that receive roads later. The RD also reports average e↵ects over a longer treatment
period, which would lead to larger point estimates if impacts are increasing over time, as suggested by
Figure 2.
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mechanisms. The strength of the regression discontinuity approach is its reliance on few as-
sumptions for causal inference, but the power of the test is limited by imperfect compliance,
as well as the restriction of the sample to villages close to threshold populations in states
that followed the allocation rules. These factors reduce the precision of the estimates and
make the estimates less representative of impacts across India. We therefore focus on the
panel setting to examine how the impacts of road connections vary in response to local labor
market conditions.
VI.D Average Impacts on School Achievement
Increasing school enrollment may not directly translate into increasing human capital, espe-
cially if school quality is low or if there are congestion e↵ects. We turn to exam scores as a
measure of what students are actually learning. Table 5 presents panel estimates of the im-
pact of new roads on a set of dependent variables describing students’ exam-taking decisions
and exam performance. We focus on middle-school completion exams, which are required if
students are to go on to high school. Column 1 estimates the e↵ect of roads on the log num-
ber of students who appear for completion exams plus one. Column 2 estimates e↵ects on the
number of students who pass the exam, and Column 3 shows e↵ects on the number who pass
with distinction.33 For exam appearance and passing, we find similar e↵ects to the enrollment
e↵ects: six percent more students take and pass exams in villages after new roads have been
built. We find a positive but smaller three percent increase in those passing with distinction.
While the percentage e↵ects are similar, the number of students achieving these outcomes is
smaller than the enrollment e↵ects, because for every ten students enrolled in the 8th grade,
only six appear for the exam, five pass the exam, and two pass the exam with distinction.
The impacts on examinations reflect the net impact on achievement and can be interpreted
in two ways. The first possibility is that the students induced to stay in school take and
pass exams at the same rate as non-marginal students (but receive slightly fewer top grades),
33Sample size is smaller for the exam estimates than for enrollment estimates because we were only able
to obtain examination results for years 2004-2009. Results are highly similar for the unbalanced panel.
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and there are no e↵ects on the exam performance of non-marginal students. Alternately,
the marginal students who were induced to stay in middle school could do worse on exams
(perhaps because there may be negative selection (in terms of ability) into the group of
students on the margin of not dropping out), but students who would have stayed in school
independent of road construction are now performing better on exams. The latter could
occur if non-marginal students perceive that human capital accumulation is more valuable
given increased access to external markets. Without data on individual student performance,
it is di cult to disentangle these two scenarios. However, in both cases we can reject the
possibility that enrollment is increasing but learning is unchanged. Rather, the exam data
show that the total stock of human capital in connected villages is increasing.
Appendix Table A5 shows comparable results for primary-school completion exams. In
contrast with the zero enrollment e↵ects in primary school, here we find weakly positive re-
sults with estimates between 2 and 3 log points, albeit with marginal statistical significance.
The p-values for exam taking, passing, and scoring with distinction, are respectively 0.07,
0.18 and 0.15. Given unchanged enrollment in primary school, this implies improved perfor-
mance among enrolled children. This could arise directly from future labor market returns to
education, or because a number of these students newly anticipate attending middle school.
VII Mechanisms
VII.A Human Capital Investment Incentives
In this section, we examine the mechanisms underlying the estimated impact of new rural
roads on human capital accumulation. The conceptual framework outlined in Section II
guides our analysis. We are interested in two primary channels: a negative opportunity
cost e↵ect and a positive returns to education e↵ect. Our goal is to identify subsets of our
sample where one of these mechanisms is likely to be particularly prevalent. Our underlying
assumption is that reductions in transportation cost will lead to factor price equalization:
when a rural village receives a new road, its wages and returns to education will adjust toward
19
the wages and returns in the broader geographic area. If the unskilled wage gap between
the village and surrounding market is high, the village unskilled wage will rise more than if
the unskilled wage gap is small. We therefore expect the largest opportunity cost e↵ects in
the places with the largest gaps in unskilled wages between the village and its surrounding
market. We therefore proxy the expected size of the opportunity cost e↵ect with the district-
level urban-rural wage gap, the most granular level at which wages can be calculated. Urban
and rural wages for this calculation are drawn from the 55th round of the National Sample
Survey (NSS), undertaken in 1999-2000, the last NSS round before the beginning of PMGSY.
To proxy for the size of the returns to education e↵ect, we again aim to identify the di↵er-
ence in returns to education between each village and its regional market. The underlying
assumption remains that a new road will shift village returns to education in the direction
of equalization with the regional market. We calculate district-level returns to education by
running Mincerian regressions at the district level, separately for individuals in rural and
urban areas. We call this di↵erence the urban-rural returns gap, or the skill premium gap.34
The source for wages and education is again the 55th round of the NSS. For all interaction
terms, we use a binary variable that indicates whether a village is above the sample median
of the given variable.
We then estimate the panel regression, interacting the impact of road construction with
the unskilled wage gap and the returns-to-education gap. If the interaction term is im-
portant in magnitude, it provides suggestive evidence that the relevant mechanism is an
important channel through which new roads a↵ect schooling decisions. Table 6 shows the
results. Column 1 repeats the main specification without interaction terms in the set of data
for which the interaction terms are non-missing.35 Columns 2 and 3 include the interac-
tion terms separately, while Column 4 includes them both. The direction of the interaction
34Specifically, in each district we regress log wage for working individuals on years of education, age, age
squared, and the log of household land owned, separately for urban and rural locations. Mincerian returns
are minimally a↵ected by alterations to this specification, such as excluding log land or including state fixed
e↵ects. We drop districts with no urban data.
35These regressions use a reduced sample because we drop all districts without NSS data for both urban
and rural areas in 1999-2000.
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estimates is consistent with the predictions from a standard human capital model. Roads
have the smallest e↵ects on schooling in districts where they would be expected to raise the
opportunity cost the most and the largest e↵ects in districts where they would be expected
to raise the skill premium the most. The opportunity cost e↵ect is strongly statistically
significant, but the returns to education e↵ect is not (p=0.20).36 The greater magnitude of
the opportunity cost e↵ect may be in part because the urban-rural wage gap is much larger
than the urban-rural skill premium gap (see Appendix Table A1).
Finally, Table 7 shows results from a fully interacted regression, which allows estimation
of treatment e↵ects in each of the four subgroups defined by the binary district categoriza-
tion. For clarity, we show estimated treatment e↵ects in each subgroup, rather than the
coe cients on the interaction terms. The point estimate on the treatment e↵ect is positive
in all four groups, but only statistically significantly di↵erent from zero when the unskilled
wage gap is low. Theory predicts the smallest treatment e↵ects for those areas with high
predicted opportunity cost e↵ects and low returns to education e↵ects (first row), and vice
versa for those areas with high returns to education e↵ects and low opportunity cost e↵ects
(last row). This is what we observe, although the individual estimates are not all statistically
distinct from each other.
This decomposition lets us identify the expected distribution of treatment e↵ects: based
on the economic conditions of their region, we can predict (with 99% confidence) that new
roads will lead to improvements in schooling in 59% of villages, with ambiguous results in
the other 41%. The point estimate of the treatment e↵ect is positive in all subgroups, a
striking result given a number of recent studies finding adverse impacts of new labor market
opportunities, which we discuss below.
These estimated interaction e↵ects are consistent with a standard human capital invest-
ment model. However, there could be other unobserved district-level characteristics that
36For completeness, Appendix Table A6 shows results for separate quartiles of the unskilled wage gap
and skill premium gap. For both variables, treatment e↵ects are monotonic or nearly so in quartiles of the
interaction variable. Appendix Table A7 shows these results for the unbalanced panel.
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influence the size of treatment e↵ects, which could be correlated with the proxies that we
use. Therefore, we see these estimates not as definitive but as suggestive indications of the
mechanisms underlying the main estimates.
The treatment heterogeneity is consistent with the ambiguous findings of earlier work on
impacts of labor demand shocks on school enrollment. Jensen (2012) and Oster and Stein-
berg (2013) find that increasing availability of call center jobs lead to increased schooling.
The first order mechanism here is likely an increase in the return to schooling, since spoken
English is a requirement for these jobs. Conversely, Shah and Steinberg (2016) find that
children are more likely to attend school in drought years, when agricultural labor market
opportunities are few. Here, the opportunity cost e↵ect is likely to be first order: agri-
cultural labor opportunities (or children’s substitution into home production while parents
are working) do not require a high level of schooling, thus the e↵ective low skill wage is
rising. The negative e↵ects on schooling of India’s national workfare program (NREGS)
(Islam and Sivasankaran, 2014; Das and Singh, 2013; Li and Sekhri, 2015; Shah and Stein-
berg, 2015) are plausibly driven by a similar e↵ect. Because NREGS hires people for labor
intensive public works, it increases the return to low skill work without a↵ecting the return
to education. The heterogeneity in impacts of labor demand shocks outside of India (e.g.,
fracking jobs in the United States (Cascio and Narayan, 2015), export manufacturing jobs in
Mexico (Atkin, 2016), and garment manufacturing Bangladesh (Heath and Mobarak, 2015))
support the same model: individual schooling choices appear to respond to the schooling
requirements of immediate labor market opportunities. Our findings on roads in some sense
capture the variation across all of these studies, as we can identify large positive e↵ects in
the places where the relative return to high skill work goes up the most, and neutral e↵ects
on schooling in places where the relative return to low skill work rises the most.
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VII.B Other Mechanisms: Migration, School Quality, Regional Displacement,
and School Accessibility
Our results indicate that new roads cause increases in middle-school enrollment. The treat-
ment heterogeneity suggests that the skill profile of labor demand outside the village may
be a primary factor explaining these impacts. In this section, we explore several alternate
mechanisms.
Migration. First, we explore whether net migration into treated villages (or reduced out-
migration) can explain increases in middle-school enrollment. We present two indications
that new roads did not substantially a↵ect net migration in treated villages. First, we use
the regression discontinuity specification to show that village population is not a↵ected by
road construction.37 Appendix Figure A5 presents the regression discontinuity graph, which
shows no discontinuity at the treatment threshold and the point estimate is close to zero.
Therefore, we rule out the net entry or exit of more than four people from a treated village.
Second, migration e↵ects would be expected to equally a↵ect families with primary-school-
aged children. As discussed above, Appendix Table A3 shows zero estimates on changes
in primary-school enrollment. There is thus little evidence that net migration explains the
e↵ects of roads on school enrollment.38
School Quality. The estimated impacts on schooling could also be influenced by changes
in school quality or in the number of schools available. Appendix Table A8 shows estimated
e↵ects of road completion on school quality, as proxied by a series of school infrastructure
measures included in the DISE data, as well as the number of schools reported in DISE. While
a minority of specifications show statistically significant e↵ects on school infrastructure, none
approach the size of the enrollment e↵ects presented above. Adjusting these estimates for
37Village population is measured only in the decennial censuses, so we cannot use the panel approach to
measure impacts on migration.
38Since the dependent variable is gross enrollment (rather than an enrollment rate), outmigration of
students with a high propensity to drop out could not drive our estimates. Students not in school do not
a↵ect enrollment figures, whether they stay in the village or not.
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multiple hypothesis testing would further weaken the case for detectable impacts of roads
on school infrastructure or school quantity. Thus, it does not appear that school enrollment
e↵ects are driven by changes in school quantity or quality.39
Other Government Programs. To alleviate any concern that other government pro-
grams could have been using the same eligibility criteria as the road program, or simulta-
neously implemented other programs along with roads, we use the regression discontinuity
approach to test for appearance of other public goods in treated villages.40 Appendix Ta-
ble A9 shows RD estimates of changes in other village-level public goods. The estimates are
all close to zero and none are statistically significantly di↵erent from zero. It does not appear
that schools, electricity, health centers or banks were delivered simultaneously to new roads.
Regional Displacement. We next explore whether our results could be driven by dis-
placement e↵ects, in which enrollment increases would be counterbalanced by declines in
enrollment in nearby villages. This mechanism seems less plausible, as villages with no road
by 2001 tended to be poor and remote, and thus unlikely to have more desirable schools
than their neighbors. Nevertheless, we calculate total annual middle-school enrollment for
all other villages within a small radius of each village that received a new road. Columns 1
and 2 of Appendix Table A10 report panel estimates of the impact of roads on log middle-
school enrollment in surrounding villages, respectively within a 3 km and a 5 km radius.41
We find precise zero impacts on these nearby villages, indicating that displacement e↵ects
are unlikely to explain the main findings.
School Accessibility. Finally, we examine the possibility that a new road impacts school-
ing by increasing accessibility to the school itself. For example, Muralidharan and Prakash
(2013) find that the provision of bicycles made girls more likely to attend middle and high
39We find similar estimates if we weight the school infrastructure variables by the number of students
attending the school, to reflect the share of children in a village who benefit from a particular kind of
infrastructure investment.
40The di↵erences-in-di↵erences specification is not available here, because we observe village public goods
only in the decennial population census.
41The average Indian village has a diameter of 2.1 km, and the average road built through this program
had a length of 4.4 km.
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school. Children usually walk to village schools, and paved roads could make them easier to
access, especially during the rainy season. We explore this hypothesis in two ways. First,
we estimate the impact of roads on schooling in villages that are more or less dispersed.
Children living in dispersed villages have further to walk to school, and thus might be ex-
pected to benefit more from a new road. We proxy village dispersion with surface area, and
divide the sample into villages with above- and below-median surface area. Columns 3 and
4 of Appendix Table A10 show that treatment e↵ects are similar in dispersed and dense vil-
lages.42 Second, if treatment e↵ects are driven by ease of access to village schools, we might
see larger e↵ects in places where there are nearby villages without middle schools—the road
could make it easier for children from a di↵erent village to access middle school. To test this,
we counted the number of school-age children within a 5 km radius of sample villages, who
were living in villages without middle schools.43 Columns 5 and 6 of Appendix Table A10
show that treatment e↵ects are similar across villages close to more or less under-served
children. The evidence does not support children’s improved ability to walk to school as a
primary mechanism for the impact of new roads.
VIII Conclusion
High local transportation costs are a central feature of the lives of the rural poor around
the world, leaving them isolated from broader domestic markets. Connecting remote villages
to high quality transportation networks is a major goal of both governments of developing
countries and development agencies. These roads can bring access to new opportunities;
however, a concern may be that access to opportunity can paradoxically cause decreased
investment in the human capital accumulation that is central to long-run growth.
We shed light on this question by studying the impact of India’s flagship rural road pro-
gram, which has built feeder roads to 115,000 villages in India between 2001 and 2011. We
42Results are similar if we use area per capita.
43We proxied the number of middle-school-aged children with the number of children aged 0-6 in 2001,
the closest estimate available from the Population Census. We find similar results if we use total village
population in villages without middle schools.
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show that the building of these roads had large positive e↵ects on adolescent school enroll-
ment and performance. Our results suggest that the standard human capital investment
model remains a powerful predictor of schooling decisions in developing countries. The local
opportunity cost of schooling and the returns to education are both predictors of the local
impacts of roads on schooling. But even where the opportunity cost e↵ects are largest and
the returns to education e↵ects smallest, we find non-negative treatment e↵ects.
This paper highlights an understudied but important impact of rural infrastructure. Road
investments are usually premised on their potential to bring economic opportunities and
growth to rural areas. If road construction leads to increased human capital accumulation,
then its long-run economic impact is likely much larger than short-run estimates suggest.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics at Baseline
Mean (SD)
Population (2001 Census) 1326.8
(1009.8)
Non-farm Employment (1998 Economic Census) 60.08
(175.5)
Number of Primary and Middle Schools 1.705
(2.036)
Total Enrollment (grades 1-8) 225.5
(413.3)
Total Primary Enrollment (grades 1-5) 183.6
(308.3)
Total Middle Enrollment (grades 6-8) 41.90
(130.2)
Middle School Exam Passers (2005) 13.98
(36.89)
Exam Passers with Distinction (2005) 5.205
(15.27)
The table shows means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of key
variables at baseline, in the sample of villages that were matched across
all analysis datasets. Unless otherwise indicated, the data source is the
District Information System for Education (DISE), 2002.
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Table 2
Impact of New Roads on Middle-School Enrollment
Dependent Variable All, log Girls, log Boys, log All, levels Girls, levels Boys, levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New Road 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.056*** 3.275*** 1.979*** 1.296***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.391) (0.299) (0.303)
N 119050 119050 119050 119050 119050 119050
r2 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.78
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The table reports panel estimates of the e↵ect of new road construction on village-level log middle school
enrollment, estimated with Equation 1. Column 1 presents the primary balanced panel specification.
The dependent variable in Columns 2 and 3 is log middle-school enrollment for girls and boys respec-
tively. Columns 4-6 repeat these three specifications, using the level of middle-school enrollment as the
dependent variable. All specifications have state-year fixed e↵ects and village fixed e↵ects, so constant
terms are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table 3
Impact of New Roads on Middle-School Enrollment:
Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New Road 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.049*** 0.042**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017)
State-Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village Time Trends Yes No No Yes No No
Baseline Vars * Year Dummies No Yes No No No No
Panel Sample Balanced Balanced Unbalanced Unbalanced Balanced Post-2004 3 Years Pre/Post
N 119050 117900 178112 178112 83335 42609
r2 0.91 0.83 0.76 0.89 0.88 0.85
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The table reports panel estimates of the e↵ect of new road construction on village log middle-school enrollment, estimated with Equation 1.
Estimates are analogous to those in Table 2, with the following modifications. Column 1 adds a separate linear time trend for each village.
Column 2 adds interactions between year fixed e↵ects and each of the following continuous village-level variables measured at baseline:
population, number of schools, log middle- and primary-school enrollment, literacy rate, population share of scheduled castes, and distance
to nearest town. Column 3 uses an unbalanced panel, adding additional villages that do not have data in all years. Column 4 adds a
village time trend to the unbalanced panel specification. Column 5 restricts the sample to years 2005 or later. Column 6 includes data
only for three years before each road is built and three years after. Di↵erent years are thus included for di↵erent villages, but each village
has seven observations. Due to data availability, the Column 6 sample only includes roads built between 2005 and 2008. All specifications
have state-year fixed e↵ects and village fixed e↵ects, so constant terms are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table 4
Impact of New Roads on Middle-School Enrollment Growth:
Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Panel A: RD Estimates
First Stage Reduced Form IV
(1) (2) (3)
Above Population Threshold 0.221*** 0.012**
0.014 0.006
New Road by 2011 0.062**
0.025
N 13777 13777 13777
r2 0.34 0.30 0.24
Panel B: Placebo RD Estimates
First Stage Reduced Form
(1) (2)
Above Population Threshold 0.017* 0.002
0.009 0.006
N 17516 17516
r2 0.38 0.41
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Panel A shows regression discontinuity estimates of the impact of new road
construction on village annualized log middle-school enrollment growth from
2002-2011, estimated with Equation 3. Column 1 reports first stage estimates
of the e↵ect of being above the state-specific population threshold (that defines
road program eligibility) on the probability of receiving a new road before
2011. Column 2 shows a reduced form regression discontinuity estimate of the
impact of being above the population eligibility threshold on log middle-school
enrollment growth. Column 3 shows the instrumental variable estimate of the
impact of a new road on village log middle-school enrollment growth. Panel
B shows a placebo test consisting of the same specification in Columns 1 and
2 of Panel A, but in the set of states that did not adhere to PMGSY rules
regarding the population eligibility threshold, and for whom there should thus
be no treatment e↵ect. All specifications control for baseline log middle-school
enrollment, illiteracy rate, number of primary schools, number of middle schools,
and the log number of non-farm jobs in the village.
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Table 5
Impact of New Roads on
Middle-School Completion Examinations
Exam Taken Exam Passed High Exam Score
(1) (2) (3)
New Road 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.035***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014)
State-Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Village F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Panel Sample Balanced Balanced Balanced
N 32239 32239 32239
r2 0.73 0.72 0.61
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The table reports panel estimates of the e↵ect of new road construction on
village-level school examination performance, estimated with Equation 1.
All columns use a balanced panel specification, analogous to Column 1 in
Table 2. The dependent variable in Columns 1 through 3 is, respectively:
(1) the log number of students sitting for the middle-school completion
examination; (2) the log number of students who pass this exam; (3) the
log number of students who pass this exam with distinction. All specifi-
cations have state-year fixed e↵ects and village fixed e↵ects, so constant
terms are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table 6
Impact of New Roads on Middle-School Enrollment:
Treatment Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New Road 0.075*** 0.121*** 0.059** 0.105***
(0.017) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030)
New Road * High Urban-Rural Unskilled Wage Gap -0.090*** -0.090***
(0.034) (0.034)
New Road * High Urban-Rural Returns Gap 0.031 0.032
(0.034) (0.034)
State-Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel Sample Balanced Balanced Balanced Balanced
N 113960 113960 113960 113960
r2 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The table reports panel estimates of the e↵ect of new road construction on village log middle-school
enrollment, interacted with binary district-level measures of the urban-rural unskilled wage gap and the
di↵erence between the urban and rural skill premium. The urban-rural wage gap is the district-level mean
unskilled urban wage minus the mean unskilled rural wage. The urban-rural returns gap is the di↵erence
between the urban and rural Mincerian return to one additional year of education. Both variables are
dichotomized, and take the value of one if the underlying variable is above the value of the median village.
The specifications use Equation 1. All columns use a balanced panel specification, analogous to Column 1
in Table 2. Column 1 repeats the main specification without interactions in the sample with non-missing
interaction variables. Columns 2 and 3 show the e↵ects of the individual interaction terms, while Column
4 jointly estimates all interaction terms. Wage and education data comes from the 55th round of the NSS
Employment and Unemployment Survey (1999-2000). All specifications have state-year fixed e↵ects and
village fixed e↵ects, so constant terms are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table 7
Treatment Heterogeneity in Estimated Road Impacts: Subgroup Estimates
Urban minus Rural Urban minus Rural Treatment Number of
Unskilled Wage Gap Skill Premium E↵ect Villages
High Low 0.010 2319
(0.033)
High High 0.051 2320
(0.033)
Low Low 0.110*** 4435
(0.035)
Low High 0.132*** 2322
(0.034)
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
The table reports panel estimates of the e↵ect of new road construction on
village log middle-school enrollment, fully interacted with binary measures
of the urban-rural unskilled wage gap and the urban-rural skill premium
gap, estimated with Equation 1 in the balanced village panel. The table
shows the estimated treatment e↵ect in each subgroup, defined by the
variables above. The number of observations varies across the bins because
the categorical variables are correlated. The urban-rural wage gap is the
district-level mean unskilled urban wage minus the mean unskilled rural
wage. The urban-rural returns gap is the di↵erence between the urban and
rural Mincerian return to one additional year of education. Both variables
are dichotomized, and take the value of one if the underlying variable is
above the value of the median village. Specifications include state-year
fixed e↵ects and village fixed e↵ects, so constant terms are not displayed.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Figure 1
PMGSY New Road Summary Statistics
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0
5,
00
0
10
,0
00
15
,0
00
Nu
m
be
r o
f n
ew
 ro
ad
s
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Panel B
0 5,000 10,000 15,000
Number of new roads
West Bengal
Uttarakhand
Uttar Pradesh
Tamil Nadu
Rajasthan
Punjab
Orissa
Meghalaya
Manipur
Maharashtra
Madhya Pradesh
Karnataka
Jharkhand
Jammu Kashmir
Himachal Pradesh
Haryana
Gujarat
Chhattisgarh
Bihar
Assam
Arunachal Pradesh
Andhra Pradesh
The panels in this figure describe the distribution of new roads built under PMGSY between
2001 and 2011, across years and states. Graphs show new roads according to their registered
completion dates. Data source: PMGSY Online Monitoring and Management System.
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Figure 2
Impact of Roads on Middle-School Enrollment:
Treatment E↵ect Time Series
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The figure shows coe cient estimates from a panel regression of log middle-school enrollment
on a set of dummy variables indicating the number of years before or since a road was
constructed, along with a set of state-by-year fixed e↵ects and village fixed e↵ects. The
estimating equation is Equation 2. Year 0 is the first year in which a road was present when
enrollment data were collected on September 30. The year before road completion (t = -1)
is the omitted indicator. 95% confidence intervals are displayed around each point estimate.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Figure 3
Regression Discontinuity First Stage:
Population and Share of Villages Treated
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The graph plots the conditional expectation function of a dummy variable indicating that a
village has received a road before 2011 (the last year in our sample period), conditioning on the
village population as reported in the 2001 Population Census. Each point represents the mean of
approximately all villages in the given bin defined by population (328 villages per bin). Population
has been centered around the state-specific threshold used for road eligibility, which is either 500 or
1000, depending on the state. Points to the right of the center line represent villages with a higher
likelihood of treatment under PMGSY, according to program rules.
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Figure 4
Regression Discontinuity Reduced Form:
Log Middle-School Enrollment Growth
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The figure plots the conditional expectation function of the mean of annualized village-level
log middle-school enrollment growth from 2002-2011, conditioning on the village population, as
reported in the 2001 Population Census of India. The Y variable is the residual of a regression of
log middle-school enrollment growth on district fixed e↵ects and baseline enrollment. Population
is centered around the state-specific threshold used for program eligibility, which is either 500 or
1000. Each point represents the mean of approximately 328 villages in the given population bin.
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Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables
Table A1
Urban vs. Rural Wages and Mincerian Returns to Education
Rural Urban
Unskilled Wage 43.6 73.3
(0.2) (0.5)
Skilled Wage 114.3 166.0
(0.9) (0.8)
Return to Education 0.068 0.080
(0.001) (0.001)
Sample Size 46120 34024
The table shows mean wages and returns
to education from the 55th round of the
NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey
(1999-2000), separately for urban and rural
areas. Wages are daily wages in Indian Rupees
(in 1999, approximately 59 INR = 1 USD); the
Mincerian return is a regression of log wages
on age, age squared, and log of household land.
An individual is considered skilled if he or she
has attained middle school or higher. Stan-
dard errors of means are shown in parentheses.
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Table A2
Impact of New Roads on Middle-School Enrollment:
District-Year Fixed E↵ects
Dependent Variable All, log Girls, log Boys, log All, levels Girls, levels Boys, levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New Road 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.043*** 2.702*** 1.724*** 0.978***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.402) (0.206) (0.224)
N 118940 118940 118940 118940 118940 118940
r2 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.79
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The table reports panel estimates of the e↵ect of new road construction on village-level log middle-school
enrollment, estimated with Equation 1. Specifications are identical to Table 2, but with district-by-year
fixed e↵ects instead of state-by-year fixed e↵ects. Column 1 presents the primary balanced panel
specification. The dependent variable in Columns 2 and 3 is log middle-school enrollment for boys and
girls respectively. Column 4 estimates the same regression with the level of middle-school enrollment as
the dependent variable. All specifications include district-year fixed e↵ects and village fixed e↵ects, so
constant terms are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table A3
Impact of New Roads on Primary-School Enrollment
Panel Reduced Form IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
New Road -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Above Population Threshold 0.002
(0.002)
N 119050 119050 178112 13777 13777
r2 0.85 0.92 0.86 0.61 0.61
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The table reports estimates of the e↵ect of new road construction on village log primary-
school enrollment. Columns 1 through 3 present panel estimates, and Columns 4 and 5
present RD estimates. Column 1 presents the main balanced panel specification. Column 2
adds village-specific time trends, and Column 3 repeats the main specification in the unbal-
anced panel. Column 4 shows the reduced form estimate of the e↵ect on log primary-school
enrollment growth of being just above the eligiblity threshold, and Column 5 presents the RD
IV estimates of the impact of the new road. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table A4
Regression Discontinuity Baseline Tests
Variable RD Estimate
Number of schools (DISE) 0.034
(0.031)
Enrollment Divided by Population 0.005
(0.005)
Log Total Enrollment (grades 1-8) 0.020
(0.022)
Log Primary Enrollment (grades 1-5) 0.038
(0.023)
Log Middle Enrollment (grades 6-8) 0.038
(0.068)
Log Students Passing Exam 0.047
(0.040)
Log Students with Distinction on Exam 0.004
(0.019)
Literacy rate (2001) 0.001
(0.004)
Scheduled Caste Population Share (2001) 0.000
(0.006)
Distance to Nearest Town (km) 0.606
(0.540)
Share of asset-poor households -0.001
(0.007)
Number of Observations 17639
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The table reports regression discontinuity estimates of the change in baseline variables
across the PMGSY eligibility threshold, using Equation 3. All variables are measured in
2002 unless otherwise specified. All specifications include district fixed e↵ects and control
linearly for population (the running variable) on each side of the treatment threshold.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The data source for all school-related variables is
the District Information System for Education (DISE); other variables are from the 2001
Population Census of India.
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Table A5
Impact of New Roads on
Primary-School Completion Examinations
Exam Taken Exam Passed High Exam Score
(1) (2) (3)
New Road 0.028* 0.021 0.024
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
State-Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Village F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Panel Sample Balanced Balanced Balanced
N 31671 31671 31671
r2 0.73 0.71 0.61
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The table reports panel estimates of the e↵ect of new road construction
on village-level primary school examination performance, estimated with
Equation 1. All columns use a balanced panel specification, analogous
to Column 1 in Table 2. The dependent variable in Columns 1 through
3 is, respectively: (1) the log of the number of students sitting for the
primary-school completion examination; (2) the log number of students
who pass this exam; (3) the log of the number of students who pass this
exam with distinction. All estimations have state-year fixed e↵ects and
village fixed e↵ects, so constant terms are not displayed. Standard errors
are clustered at the village level.
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Table A6
Treatment Heterogeneity in Road Impacts:
Quartile Results
Panel A: Wage Gap Quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New Road 0.144*** 0.100*** 0.033 0.015
0.026 0.021 0.021 0.024
N 28190 27990 31550 26230
r2 0.76 0.82 0.81 0.79
Panel B: Return Gap Quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New Road 0.060*** 0.092*** 0.080*** 0.101***
0.021 0.026 0.022 0.023
N 29910 27070 27900 29080
r2 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.80
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The table reports panel estimates of the e↵ect of new road
construction on village log middle-school enrollment. The
estimates are calculated separately by urban-rural wage
gap quartiles (top panel) and urban-rural skill premium
gap quartiles (bottom panel). The estimating equation is
Equation 1. The urban-rural wage gap is the district-level
mean unskilled urban wage minus the mean unskilled rural
wage. The urban-rural returns gap is the di↵erence between
the urban and rural Mincerian return to one additional
year of education. All specifications include state-year fixed
e↵ects and village fixed e↵ects, so constant terms are not
displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table A7
Treatment Heterogeneity in Road Impacts:
Unbalanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New Road 0.075*** 0.130*** 0.060*** 0.115***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025)
New Road * High Urban-Rural Unskilled Wage Gap -0.106*** -0.106***
(0.028) (0.028)
New Road * High Urban-Rural Returns Gap 0.030 0.029
(0.028) (0.028)
State-Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel Sample Balanced Balanced Balanced Balanced
N 171637 171637 171637 171637
r2 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The table reports panel estimates of the e↵ect of new road construction on village log middle-school
enrollment, interacted with binary district-level measures of the urban-rural unskilled wage gaps and the
urban-rural skill premium gap. The estimating equation is Equation 1. All columns are analogous to those in
Table 6, but this table uses the unbalanced panel rather than the balanced panel. The urban-rural wage gap
is the district-level mean unskilled urban wage minus the mean unskilled rural wage. The urban-rural returns
gap is the di↵erence between the urban and rural Mincerian return to one additional year of education. Both
variables are dichotomized and are equal to one if the underlying variable is above the value of the median
village. All specifications include state-year fixed e↵ects and village fixed e↵ects, so constant terms are not
displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table A8
Panel and Regression Discontinuity Estimates of
Impact of Roads on School Infrastructure
Dependent Variable Balanced Unbalanced
Panel Panel RD
Piped Water 0.001 0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
Toilet 0.003 0.016*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Electricity 0.003 0.004** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Library 0.000 0.006 0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Computer -0.004** -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Perimeter Wall 0.001 0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.009)
Playground 0.009** 0.007* 0.011
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
Log Number of Schools 0.000 0.001 0.006
(0.000) (0.002) (0.005)
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
The table reports panel estimates of the e↵ect of new road construction on village-level school infrastructure,
estimated with Equation 1 (Columns 1-2) and Equation 3 (Column 3). Each entry in the table shows
a treatment e↵ect analogous to the “New Road” row in Table 2, and thus each entry represents a distinct
regression. The left column shows the dependent variable for each regression, and the column header describes
the sample. Column 1 presents the main balanced panel specification. Column 2 presents results from the
unbalanced panel. Columns 1 and 2 include state-year fixed e↵ects and village fixed e↵ects, and standard
errors are clustered at the village level. Column 3 presents reduced form regression discontinuity estimates
of the impact on the infrastructure variable of being in a village just above the treatment threshold.
48
Table A9
Regression Discontinuity Placebo Estimates:
Other Public Goods
Dep. Var. Prim. School Mid. School Sec. School Electricity Health Center Bank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Above Population Threshold -0.008 0.012 -0.001 0.016 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002)
N 16973 16973 16973 16973 16973 16973
r2 0.37 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.09 0.08
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
The table shows reduced form regression discontinuity estimates of the change in public goods other than roads across the PMGSY population
treatment threshold, using Equation 3. The dependent variable, column by column, is (i) presence of primary school; (ii) presence of middle school;
(iii) presence of secondary school; (iv) village access to electric power; (v) presence of a primary health center; and (vi) presence of a commercial
bank. All specifications include district fixed e↵ects and control for baseline baseline log middle-school enrollment, illiteracy rate, number of primary
schools, number of middle schools, and the log number of non-farm jobs in the village (measured in 2001).
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Table A10
Impact of Roads on Middle-School Enrollment:
Spatial E↵ects
Spillovers Village Area Nearby Eligible Kids
3 km 5 km Low High Low High
New Road 0.006 0.013 0.072*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.059***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
State-Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel Sample Balanced Balanced Balanced Balanced Balanced Balanced
N 114240 117270 90358 86566 76513 76515
r2 0.90 0.89 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.75
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
This table shows panel estimates of the impact of road construction on log middle-school
enrollment. Columns 1 and 2 show the impact of a new road on middle-school enrollment
in nearby villages, respectively those within a 3 km and 5 km radius. Columns 3 and 4
divide the sample into villages with above-median land area per person and below-median land
area per person, and report e↵ects separately. Columns 5 and 6 divide the sample into villages
according to their proximity to children in villages without middle schools. Column 5 shows the
e↵ect of new roads on middle-school enrollment in villages with few nearby children in villages
without middle schools; Column 6 shows estimates in villages where there are many nearby
underserved schoolchildren. All specifications include state-year fixed e↵ects and village fixed
e↵ects, so constant terms are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Figure A1
Sample Construction
589,573	villages	in	
DISE
466,509	villages	in	PMGSY	
administrative	data
152,028	with	PMGSY	roads	
built	between	2001-2014
525,237	villages	in	
2001	Population	
Census
243,837	villages	
matched	across	
all	datasets
n	=	233,988
Balanced	Panel
n	=	11,905	villages
Drop	DISE	errors	
and	missing	data*
n	=	112,475
Drop	villages	with	
road	in	2001
Unbalanced	Panel
n	=	17,920
Keep	villages	with	PMGSY	road	
built	between	2002	and	2010
Keep	villages	with	
enrollment	data	in	all	years
The figure shows how we arrived at our final number of observations from the original
datasets. DISE = District Information System for Education. PMGSY = Prime Minister’s
Road Building Program. All observation counts indicate number of villages at each stage.
*Observations were dropped if DISE reported grade one to eight enrollment greater than
60% of village population (99th percentile). State-years were dropped if DISE reported
enrollment for fewer than 25% of villages (Jharkhand 2005, Karnataka 2005, Uttarakhand
2006).
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Figure A2
Panel Estimates of E↵ect of Roads on
Middle-School Enrollment: Permutation Test
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The table shows the distribution of estimates from a placebo permutation test of the main panel speci-
fication presented in Column 1 of Table 2. For each village in the main sample, we randomly generated a
placebo year of road completion, and then estimated Equation 1. We ran this estimation 1000 times; the
graph shows the distribution of estimates of  , which would be the impact of a new road on log middle-school
enrollment.
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Figure A3
Regression Discontinuity: Continuity of Running Variable
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The figures show the distribution of village population in the set of villages in our sample. The top panel
shows a histogram of village population, centered around the treatment threshold. In the bottom panel,
we plot a non-parametric regression to each half of the distribution following McCrary (2008), testing for a
discontinuity at the treatment threshold.
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Figure A4
Regression Discontinuity: Continuity of Baseline Variables
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The graphs show the distribution of baseline variables against the regression discontinuity running variable,
population. We have subtracted the treatment eligibility threshold from the population variable so that
eligibility for the road program rises discontinuously at zero. Each point in the graphs represents the mean
baseline value of the variable in the set of villages within a given population bin. We fit a linear function to
the data on each side of the treatment threshold, and show 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A5
Regression Discontinuity Reduced Form:
Population
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The figure shows the conditional expectation function of the mean of annualized village-level
population in 2011, conditioning on the village population in 2001. 2001 Population (the X axis)
is normalized to be centered around the state-specific threshold used for program eligibility.
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